Introduction
In the eighteenth century, the European presence in the Indian Ocean region was largely limited to the administrative, commercial, and military personnel of coastal settlements. The Cape and the Mascarenes differed from these, resembling more closely European plantation colonies in the Caribbean where white settlers dominated large slave populations of Afro-Asian origin. Although only 30 to 40 days of sailing time separated Port Louis from Table Bay, relations between the Mascarenes and the Cape were limited due to the mercantilist character of European trading companies which ensured that they maintained chiefly intra-colonial rather than inter-colonial relations. Indeed, from the mid-seventeenth century, Franco-Dutch relations were characterized by conflict and their interaction in the Indian Ocean by imperial rivalry. Amicable exchanges between the two were virtually non-existent until the middle of the eighteenth century.
In the early modern period, the Indian Ocean World (IOW) was a crossroads, a meeting place of different cultures. Nevertheless, conventional historiography reflects a somewhat nationalistic approach; while much has been written about the different European companies active in the Indian Ocean, and the political interests driving them, scholars have tended to focus on a single company rather than analyze them as related phenomena. In addition, they have emphasized the mercantilist and insular character of each European empire. 3 Scholars have researched issues of political and economic rivalry to a greater extent than cooperation between the different empires, and there is an absence of microhistories. However, while individual European stations in the IOW have been seen through metropolitan eyes as relatively static entities, they necessarily had to engage in some local initiative in order to overcome day-to-day problems. 4 Probably the greatest amount of research on eighteenth-century European colonization in the IOW has focused on the Dutch colony at the Cape. 5 This is thanks to the exceptional abundance of archival material about the Cape, and Dutch scholarly interest in the history of their former colony. The French presence on Mauritius has also been well documented, and for similar reasons. 6 The main historical foci in both regions have been political (the changes of regimes) and social history. 7 Only recently have researchers of the Indian Ocean region started to focus on intra-regional, namely commercial and cultural interactions, between Europeans and local populations, and on slavery and the slave trade. 8 It is against this background that this article helps break new ground in analyzing the interconnections within and across the French and Dutch empires in the IOW, and the formation of global imperial networks. 9 Although historians have noted the existence of relations between the Dutch and French colonial empires during the Seven Years' War, we lack real insight into the nature of their interactions. 10 Much can be learned from analyzing the dynamics of these exchanges, as other work on networks in the IOW has shown.
11 Although this article focuses on a single event, it does so in the context of a growing Franco-Dutch commercial relationship, and its wider socio-economic and political consequences. It draws primarily on research into primary sources in the Western Cape Archives, Cape Town and the Archives Nationales d'Outre-mer, Aix-enProvence (ANOM). The latter houses the very rich C4 series which contains detailed documents on divergent subjects concerning the history of the southwest Indian Ocean region, most importantly slavery.
12 Due to conservation issues, very few documents from the Compagnie des Indes regime remain intact in the National Archives of Mauritius. However, the Nationaal Archief at The Hague, the Western Cape Archives in Cape Town, and multiple archives in France have provided important additional information on the subject, especially the letters and the personal journals of two governors of the Town: Longman, 1979 Mascarenes, René Magon de la Villebague and Antoine Marie Desforges-Boucher.
In this article, we have used these primary sources to study the important political and commercial interactions between the Mascarenes and the Cape, especially during the Seven Years' War. Although for most historians, the "French period at the Cape" 13 came later, from 1781 to 1783 when French troops were stationed at the Cape in order to defend it from English aggression, significant numbers of French warships called at the Cape during previous conflicts, some remaining there for several months in order to take advantage of good local harvests. These exchanges, we argue, benefitted not only the French, it also had a significant economic impact on Cape and its inhabitants.
This article first provides an overview of Franco-Dutch rivalry in the IOW between the early seventeenth and late eighteenth centuries. Second, it examines in turn the first interactions between the Dutch colony at the Cape and the French Mascarenes, and the outbreak of war which increased direct relations between the two colonies. The driving forces behind this rapprochement were, on the French islands, chronic food shortages and isolation from the metropolis and, at the Cape, the prospects of commercial profit that this offered. We conclude by detailing the impact of the French presence at the Cape during this period of cordial relations, and of post-conflict inter-colonial relations.
Early Franco-Dutch Contact in the Indian Ocean World
From 1595 the Dutch, following the example of the Portuguese and English, started trading expeditions to the East Indies.
14 Within a few years, they founded the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company or VOC), which until the end of the eighteenth century held a monopoly of Dutch trade in the IOW. The French, who sporadically voyaged into this region in the first half of the seventeenth century, established their first serious commercial venture there from the 1640s with the founding of Fort Dauphin, on the southeast coast of Madagascar.
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This was a relatively modest accomplishment compared to the commercial empire the VOC had by then established and which, following the conquest of the Moluccas (the Spice Islands) in 1605, and the foundation fourteen years later of Batavia, on the island of Java, as their regional capital, focused predominantly on the East Indies.
In 1638, the Dutch also established themselves on the uninhabited island of Mauritius, chiefly to exploit its sources of ebony. From there, they started a modest trade with the east coast of Madagascar, where they encountered some French outposts. 16 
First Interactions Between the Two Colonies
Franco-Dutch relations in the IOW were traditionally characterized by hostility. As late as the 1720s, some Frenchmen thought that Pasques de Chavonnes (1654-1724), governor of the Cape from 1714 to 1721, was poised to forcibly retake the Île de France.
22 Imperial rivalry was also marked by commercial competition. Initially, there were no direct relations between the Dutch Cape and the French Mascarenes due to their secondary importance to the Dutch East Indies and French settlements in South Asia respectively. The French had their capital on the Indian peninsula (Pondicherry) where their commercial interest focused on textiles, while the Dutch from Batavia concentrated on the East Indies spice trade. 23 French ships occasionally called at the Cape, but only for provisions. In December 1743, La Bourdonnais sent a ship, the Triton, to the Cape with two letters. The first requested the purchase of wine for the Mascarenes in return for ebony wood, coffee, tobacco, and Spanish piastres. The second, much bolder, proposed to Dutch governor Hendrik Swellengrebel (1700-1760) a trade agreement whereby the Cape would annually supply the Mascarenes with 500 to 600 barrels of wine in exchange for ebony. 29 Although the Cape authorities were eager to accept the first proposal as being "beneficial and without inconveniency for the Company [VOC], " they refused the second. 30 Nevertheless, this constituted the first formal direct contact between the authorities of the two colonies.
Agriculture on the Mascarenes also developed under La Bourdonnais, but in a quite differentl way to that of the Cape. As early as the 1720s, a plantation economy similar to that of the Caribbean islands had emerged on the largely on sugar, cotton, and indigo, as well as ebony wood, and relied on Bourbon, which also produced significant amounts of coffee, for grain. 31 However, due to systematic Compagnie discouragement of subsistence agriculture, the Mascarenes failed to produce enough food to feed its growing number of mostly servile inhabitants, let alone supply passing ships. 32 La Bourdonnais tried to ensure that sufficient land was reserved for the growing of basic food crops and to maintain cattle herds-but with little success. 33 In order to overcome the lack of self-sufficiency in provisions, the Mascarenes sent ships on a frequent basis to the east coast of Madagascar, primarily to Foulpointe, in order to obtain rice, livestock, and salted beef, as well as slaves. Pondicherry and Bengal also regularly sent rice to the Mascarenes, and the island of Rodrigues provided tortoises. Nevertheless, food on the Mascarenes was often in short supply. As Rose Pinczon du Sel (1730-1824) 34 wrote in 1753: "We lack everything on Mauritius [Île de France]. There are no bullocks, sheep, calves or flour. Hunting is forbidden, subject to major punishment. The population live on rice and fish. Poultry can only be had at an exorbitant price. " 35 The same year, she noted in another letter, "The cost of living is very high, and even money cannot buy everything" 36 By contrast, land at the Cape was devoted entirely to growing food crops. In the first half of the eighteenth century, the output of wheat and wine increased sufficiently to provision passing VOC and foreign ships and send annual cargoes of wheat to Batavia, Negapattinam, and even to the Netherlands. 37 However, in the 1750s, the Cape experienced an economic slump that was due chiefly to the highly centralized structure of the VOC. Each year, the company Directors in the Netherlands, the Heren XVII (the Lords Seventeen), sent directives to the Governor of the Cape and his Council. 38 All commerce was in the hands of the company and the inhabitants of the Cape had to cultivate a certain quota of crops that the VOC purchased at low fixed prices. The Council at the Cape decided whether or not to sell company grain to foreign ships, but generally, if supplies were abundant, and a reasonable price offered, would not refuse. 39 However, the VOC maintained a commercial monopoly despite the petitions of local Dutch settlers in 1719 and 1732 to grant them the right to trade privately. 40 The settlers were also resentful of the heavy stamp duties imposed on imported and exported products like wheat and wine. 41 Nevertheless, La Bourdonnais' proposal in 1743 to encourage trade between the Cape and the Mascarenes persuaded the VOC to modify its regulations and, in 1746, Cape residents were permitted to buy Mauritian ebony from French ships calling there. 42 Around the same time, Cape wine also started to be sold to foreign ships, French Mascarene vessels appearing to constitute the most important buyers. 43 Such trade increased significantly from the start of war in the 1750s. The situation was different on the Mascarenes, where the governor had more freedom to act. For a few years, he authorized private trade for Mascarene settlers, albeit within Compagnie regulations. 44 Further, although some "pacotille" [goods that ship officers were authorized to trade on their private account] was authorized in limited quantities for naval officers, it soon developed into an important contraband trade. 45 La Bourdonnais' trade proposal would certainly have raised some eyebrows in Lorient, headquarters of the Compagnie in France, but because of the pressing need in the Mascarenes for provisions and European supplies, no effective action was taken against it.
War and Diplomacy
The outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 between England and France placed the Dutch Republic in a delicate position. Although multiple defense treaties bound them to the English, the Dutch were very anxious about the rising naval power of their ally and the commercial competition this posed. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1744-1748), the Dutch had also been witness to the ineffectiveness of the barrier system 39 46 Finally, the Dutch government opted for neutrality, a position much welcomed by the VOC which was suffering from a commercial slump. There was even some speculation during the war that the VOC might combine with the French Compagnie to oppose the English. 47 Even before the beginning of the Seven Years War, the French Mascarenes faced acute food shortages due to disturbances in Madagascar, notably internecine strife between 1750 and 1765, and frequent locust swarms that devastated crops along the east coast of the island. 48 At the same time, warfare between the French and English on the Indian peninsula reduced traditional supplies of rice and cattle to the Mascarenes. 49 Additionally, Bourbon produced insufficient food for the Île de France and the French navy. It was in these circumstances that governor Magon noted: "the difficult situation in which I find myself, and the pressing need that I have to draw help from all quarters in order to secure the life of my men and for whom I will have to find subsistence, has galvanized me" to send the ship St. Charles from Port Louis to the Cape (it sailed on 3 February 1756).
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Magon wrote to Tulbagh, the governor at the Cape, asking him to authorize the French captain of the St. Charles to buy 80 to 90 last 51 of wheat for the islands. This request was highly unusual. According to the Politieke Raad ("Council of Policy") at the Cape, only two similar requests had been made by foreigners: that of the vessel the Triton in 1743, demanding wine, and that of three English Indiamen in 1752 requesting wheat to take to Bengal. 52 The Mascarene authorities also searched for other sources of provisions, sending expeditions to Queda, 53 Batavia, 54 and Rio de Janeiro. 55 However, due to its proximity and plentiful supplies, the Cape remained their most important source of wheat, and Madagascar their most important source of rice and livestock, throughout the conflict.
During the first five years of his administration, Rijk Tulbagh (1699-1771), governor of the Cape from 1751 to 1771, celebrated the centenary of the foundation of the colony, and witnessed an increase in the number of French vessels calling at the port. Further, he 
siege of Madras in 1758, the French commander Lally had confiscated the VOC ship Haarlem and seized the Dutch factory in Sadras, near Pondicherry, they forbade the Cape governor to sell company wheat and wine to the Mascarene authorities. 63 This, of course, placed constraints upon the Cape governor, but we have reason to believe that he continued to help the French. Moreover, contact between the governors of the two islands lasted beyond the administrative terms of the governorships of the Cape and Mascarenes. In 1768, for example, Tulbagh invited Desforges-Boucher, two years after the end of his governorship, to visit the Cape -an invitation accepted by the Frenchman who wanted to see the "magnificent colony" of his friend to whom he again expressed gratitude for his assistance during the war.
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On the Brink of Famine
Although by the mid-eighteenth century the Mascarenes occasionally produced agricultural surpluses with which to provision passing ships, 65 cyclones, droughts, and vermin such as rats, birds, and locusts ensured that they continued to suffer frequent food shortages. 66 Thus Rose Pinsczon du Sel wrote in September 1757 that "this wonderful world has no money, provisions or munitions. " 67 On multiple occasions, Magon informed the Compagnie directors that he urgently needed all kinds of provisions from Europe in order to "avoid dying of hunger, " 68 as well as military supplies. Compagnie ships and naval squadrons that regularly called at Port Louis drew heavily on available local stocks that proved of vital importance. Thus, although in October 1757, Magon expressed his fear that it would be impossible to feed the 7000 sailors and soldiers whose arrival was anticipated, 69 early in 1758 the Hermione arrived at Port Louis from the Cape loaded with 713,000 pounds of wheat. 70 Had it not, the islands would have had to have subsisted on corn and manioc. 71 However, the situation became critical again later the same year due to the presence of the French squadron under the command of Anne Antoine, Comte d' Aché (1701-1780) who, unlike the governor who was under Compagnie orders, answered directly to | 140 the crown and had priority over maritime affairs. 72 As locally produced and imported provisions proved insufficient to supply both the naval squadron and local settlers, d' Aché finally agreed in the autumn of 1758 to send eight ships with 4,500 sailors and soldiers to the Cape in order to relieve the burden on the French islands. The fleet returned in 1759 with almost 2 million pounds of wheat, enabling d' Arché to sail the squadron to the French post of Pondicherry. 73 However, relief was temporary on the Mascarenes where in January 1760 a violent cyclone ruined most crops and destroyed or damaged many naval vessels. 74 Also, the French, who had lost all their possessions in Bengal, were forced to abandon the siege of Madras, and soon Pondicherry found itself besieged by the English. This pushed governor Desforges-Boucher into renouncing his intention of sending two more ships to the Cape as "their desolate state would send a signal to the English that the French fleet was in no situation to send help to the Indian peninsula. " 75 In addition, the government had to feed nearly 9,000 people (4,217 residents and 4,758 sailors) -6,500 of whom required an estimated 228,240 pounds of bread every month. 76 Although Desforges-Boucher dispatched six ships sent to the Cape in 1761, only two brought back provisions surplus to the immediate needs of the fleet. 77 The following When the VOC directors forbade Tulbagh to trade wheat from the company granaries, the Cape inhabitants provided some relief. For example, in 1761, an agreement was concluded between the French and a certain Jan Vogel for the delivery of wheat and An Informal French-Dutch Alliance: Trade and Diplomacy Between the Cape Colony and the Mascarenes, 1719 -1769 flour. 79 Again, the following year, Otto Luder Hemmy supplied the French with provisions, albeit with great difficulty and at high prices. 80 According to historian George Theal, the arrival of the French squadron in 1758-59 doubled or even tripled the price of wheat which, in 1760, increased to 10 livres per 100 pounds. 81 This trade was highly advantageous to residents of the Cape who, between the 1750s and 1770s, experienced abundant harvests and surplus wheat stocks, which caused prices paid by the VOC to remain stagnant. 82 Year During the Seven Years' War, around one-fifth (20 out of 105) foreign vessels calling at the Cape were French ships supplying the Mascarenes. 84 The French obtained at least 6.8 million pounds of wheat from the Cape, or an annual average of nearly one million pounds, without taking into account supplies delivered to warships calling at the Cape. Moreover, the figures in Table 1 exclude significant quantities of flour and biscuits, highly important commodities for the Mascarenes given that Bourbon Island during this period could provide a maximum of only 600,000 pounds of wheat in a year characterized by a good harvest. 85 Moreover, Cape grain, which usually consisted of "old wheat" from previous harvests, was preferred by settlers on the Mascarenes as it produced about 30 | 142 percent more flour than their own wheat. 86 At the same time, wine became the second most important export from the Cape to the Mascarenes, cut off by hostilities from European supplies of wine. As early as 1756, Magon bemoaned the fact that the officers of the St. Charles had not used their remaining stock of silver coins to buy Cape wine. 87 In 1761, nearly 20,000 litres were shipped from the Cape to the Mascarenes aboard the French ship Mauras. 88 In addition, as a duty existed on the private sale of wheat, wine and brandy to strangers, the VOC did not oppose this particular trade as long as their own ships and settlements were well supplied. Indeed, between 1759 and 1761, when they had surplus stocks, inhabitants of the Cape gained a profit of 4,402 guilders on the wheat they sold. 89 Further, the Cape helped supply Mascarene demand for a variety of European products including construction wood and naval equipment (see Table 4 ). The renowned botanist, Jean Baptiste Christophore Fusée-Aublet (1720-1778), commanded by the Compagnie to establish a pharmacy and botanical garden on the Mascarenes, even demanded that ships from the Cape should bring vine plants and fruit trees to be planted locally. Thus wheat from the Cape saved the Mascarenes from famine. More importantly, wheat was the staple food for Europeans who used it to make bread and biscuits. In the IOW, rice and corn were more readily available than wheat. However, they were used 86. ANOM, COL/C4/9, without folio, Magon's personal journal, April 4, 1757. almost exclusively to feed African and Asian slaves, sepoys, and lascars. Consequently, Europeans, especially soldiers and sailors not familiar with the East Indies, considered rice and corn as of "lower" status to wheat and insisted on being supplied with bread. 92 Nevertheless, local authorities tried to induce their European troops to eat other types of grain and, in 1758, decided that every sailor would receive, on a daily basis, bread made from a mixture of wheat and corn, and a portion of rice. 93 The sailors and soldiers resisted the measure, Desforges-Boucher noting that it was impossible to contain the garrison "whose fear of being deprived of bread was greater than that of a military invasion. " 
CommercialUpheaval
The Cape authorities initially forbade trade with the Mascarenes but, because of their neutral status during the Seven Years War, they responded positively to the opportunity then presented by growing French demand for provisions. The French sought chiefly wheat and wine at the Cape, purchased with cash or exchanged for ebony wood and coffee. In 1756, for instance, the St. Charles carried ebony on its second voyage to the Cape 99 where, four years later, 300 ebony logs, weighing 30,000 pounds, were bought for 350 Spanish piastres. sailed from Port Louis called at Bourbon Island, the regional centre of coffee production.
As ongoing hostilities prevented the Compagnie from ensuring a secure maritime trade route between the Indian Ocean and France, Mascarene planters sought the opportunity to sell their produce via naval officers visiting the neutral Cape. This first happened on the second voyage of the St. Charles in 1757, when officers offloaded and sold 100 bales of coffee. Four years later, 424,000 pounds of Bourbon coffee were offloaded there. 101 From 1761-3, the Heren XVII expressly demanded that the Cape authorities buy significant quantities of coffee and ebony wood from passing French ships, as they could sell both commodities in the United Provinces for a markup of 150 percent. 102 For the Mascarene authorities, this illicit trade was equally important because through it they could obtain cash, as in 1761, when the Condé sold 80,000 pounds of coffee for 6000 Spanish piastres which could be used to obtain more wheat, or rice from Madagascar. 103 In 1758, the French still had enough financial resources to send Commander Ruis to the Cape with a significant sum of money to buy provisions. 104 Cash, however, was becoming increasingly rare. Two years later, the Gange sailed to the Cape with 20,000 Spanish piastres, which accounted for "almost all our remaining funds. " 105 This represented a major difficulty for the French, as the Dutch accepted only silver coins in exchange for provisions. 106 At the same time, Magon explained the problems that came with a lack of cash: "the little money that circulates in the colony will soon be exhausted. There will then remain no resource other than the Cape, if the Dutch wish to trade entirely in bills of exchange. " 107 Therefore, during the 1760s, the French were obliged to use bills of exchange, which were backed by Compagnie funds. 108 The problem with these bills was that, in order to ensure credibility and compete with foreign traders -such as the English whose vessels called at the Cape -the Dutch demanded for them a high rate of interest
